This publication describes the means for legally challenging the mechanisms for "discounting" in adult sexual assault cases.

© Copyright 1998 K. E. Renner. This is a pre-publication copy of a working manuscript; it is intended for critical comments and feedback. Individual copies may be reproduced for use in direct support of the National Action Program Against Sexual Assault. For further information on this research series see: www.napasa.org

Is logic optional in the court room?
 

On the surface, this questions seems like an oxymoron. The credibility of the courts rests on careful judgements based on reason. If one is in a courtroom, surely logic is not optional. The goal of the justice process is to uncover the truth through an impassioned analysis of facts (Davis, Lloyd-Bostock, McMurran & Wilson, 1995). Yet, when the qualifier "in sexual assault trials" is added, the issue becomes problematic. For example, the analysis of the language of sexual assault trials has made clear that myths about rape and stereotypes about perpetrators and victims of rape enter into the legal process such that logic is overshadowed (Coates, Bavelas, Gibson, 1994; Matoesian, 1993). Further, the justice system is perceived by victims of sexual assault as unfair to them as revealed in the evaluation sponsored by the Department of Justice (Roberts, Grossman & Gebotys, 1996), as well as by victim-witnesses (Konradi, 1997, 1998). The magnitude of the problem is documented by the Statistic Canada (1993) finding, that of the women who self-report having been sexually assaulted, in only .008 of the cases did the offender receive a jail term. This is an exceeding small proportion of cases that eventually find their way to trial and are both convicted and sentenced, given both the seriousness of the offense and the fact that in 85% of sexual assault cases the offender is known to the victim and easily identifiable (Gregory & Lees, 1994). In sum, the data is overwhelming that there is a fundamental flaw in the legal system that creates a social problem of massive proportions.
 

In this paper, we aim to document that not only are the legal procedures necessary for a free and democratic society flawed, but these procedures systematically discriminate against an identifiable group (women and children who are victims of sexual assault) for whom the legal process is the official means of recourse. Our objectives are to illustrate the distortions of the truth that commonly occur in the courtroom by way of myths and stereotypes about rape, and to identify the techniques of persuasion, frequently based on illogical arguments, that serve to deny justice to victims of sexual assault.
 

In our on-going studies of sexual assault and sexual abuse, we have collected and analyzed quantitative data about the outcomes of cases from court records (Yurchesyn, Keith & Renner, 1992; Renner, Alksnis & Park, 1997) and obtained qualitative data about the court process from court transcripts (Park & Renner, 1998; Parriag & Renner, 1998). For adults, there are 24 categories that capture the type of questions that sexual assault victims are asked when they give testimony (Parriag & Renner, 1998). These categories can be collapsed into two groups: tactics (methods of questioning) and themes (content of questioning). Tactics are well-known techniques for distorting communication that come directly from the psychology of social influence. Themes refer to specific subject matter that reflects common myths and stereotypes about sexual assault (e.g., sexual assault "requires" that there be torn clothing, active resistance on the part of the victim and a complaint filed soon after the incident). In all, the present analysis draws upon 1,709 clear examples of the 24 themes and tactics that were detected in the testimony provided by 58 victim witnesses in a total of 54 trials (some trials had more than one victim witness).Exemplars from each of the 24 categories were analyzed to determine the degree to which the substance of sexual assault trials were composed of logical fallacies which prevented the determination of the truth. This paper examines whether the questioning that occurs in sexual assault trials meets the standard of logic.
 

The branch of philosophy known as logic provides rules which establish when an argument may be considered true or false. These rules comprise the only valid standards for evaluating whether an argument rests upon sound reasoning. A logical argument requires accuracy in both structure and content -- we have found that many of the arguments presented in sexual assault trials are lacking on one or both of these counts. This paper documents four ways in which the arguments advanced in sexual assault trials can fail to adhere to the standards of logic.
 

False Premises
 

An argument based on false premises may not be easy to recognize. It is rare that the false premise is as obvious as it is in the following simple example:
 

The error in this argument hinges on the false premise that a horse can be a cow. No one would be misled by this particular argument. Clearly, the conclusion that a horse in the barn can be milked is false, even though the argument conforms to the formal structure dictated by the rules of logic:
 

However, propaganda, advertising and deliberate distortions of communication frequently incorporate more subtle (yet false) premises within arguments that have the correct formal structure, and which give the appearance of a logical conclusion. This technique has been detected in sexual assault trials whereby false assumptions based on myths and stereotypes about the nature of sexual assault are incorporated into lawyer's arguments. For example, the assumption is frequently made that all women at a bar who are drinking and dancing are available for sex. When a sexual assault victim reports that she was drinking and dancing at a bar, she is seen as having consented to sex. When false premises are accepted as part of an argument, membership in a category is sufficient to reach a false conclusion. This point can be illustrated by substituting "women" for "horse," "sexually available" for "cow" and "consent" for "milk" in our original example:
 

So prevalent is this basic logical error regarding implied consent, that in 1992 legislation (Bill C-49) was passed in Canada to make consent to sexual activity an explicit requirement, rather than an implied default based on some circumstance, such as drinking and dancing. This change in the law was required because judicial decisions frequently cited the stereotyped belief that consent could be reasonably (although sometimes mistakenly) assumed if there was no evidence of non-consent (Sheehy, 1996).
 

As a further example, Florida passed a special law in 1997 which stated that the act of providing a condom to an assailant was not evidence of consent. The law was passed in response to a case involving a stranger who broke into a single woman's home in the night, and threatened her with harm if she struggled or screamed. This man was acquitted of sexual assault because the woman's request that he use a condom, so as not to be further injured, was viewed by the jury as a reasonable basis for mistakenly assuming consent. The outcome of this particular case is shocking given that it is illogical (based on a false premise) to assume that a woman who protects herself from potential additional harm has actually consented to sex with a stranger who unlawfully entered her home.
 

Similarly outrageous examples of false premises occurred in the 54 trials we analyzed. In one particular case, a defense attorney asked a woman why she did not object to the sexual advances made by her alleged attacker. The victim had been forcibly dragged to an isolated location on the waterfront at 2 a.m. on a cold winter night and forced to disrobe and perform oral sex on her assailant while he remained fully clothed:
 

Defense: And in fact when he said "I want you to go down on me," you sat up on your knees and proceeded to perform oral sex on him, is that not correct?

Witness: Yes, yes.
Defense: Now during that time, before doing that, did you ever say to [the accused], "No, I don't want to do that."
Witness: I... no, I was afraid. I was...
Defense: Please, [victim's name]! If you could answer the question.
Witness: I said no.
 

The Defense asked the victim whether she protested or made clear to the accused that she was not a willing participant just before performing oral sex. However, the defense glosses over the relevant circumstances that the incident occurred in a deserted area where the victim had no hope of capturing the attention of passers by and that the accused was much larger and stronger than the victim and had already threatened to throw her in the frigid water. Any display of resistance by the victim, verbal or otherwise, was clearly futile. It is reasonable to expect that the victim was concerned for her own safety and fearful of doing anything to further provoke her attacker. Yet when the victim answered truthfully that she did not protest at that particular point in the chain of events, the conclusion that was drawn by the Defense (and evidently by the jury -- the defendant in this case was acquitted) was that she did not make it sufficiently clear to the accused that she was not consenting to the sexual activity. This conclusion is outrageous and unsupportable. The unfortunate fact is that this line of questioning is considered fair from a legal perspective.
 

Categorical Fallacies
 

The logical errors detailed in this section hinge on errors related to the structure of an argument rather than its content. Formal logical arguments are frequently presented as categorical syllogisms in which there are three propositions and three terms. Each of the terms is used twice and the argument involves explication of how all, some or none of the elements belong or do not belong in a particular category. In all, there are 256 different relationships among terms that can be delineated within these parameters, most of which comprise invalid deductive arguments (Copi, 1968, p.156) according to the rules of logic. For example, whenever the two premises each contain a negative the conclusion must necessarily be false as is evident in the following argument:
 

However, it is possible to present the elements of this invalid argument in a form that appears logically correct. In sexual assault cases, this invalid argument might be expressed in the following way:
 

The conclusion in this argument does not follow from the two statements that precede it. Although some nonconsensual sex acts result in torn clothing, some nonconsensual acts do not, thus the lack of torn clothing is not indicative of consensual sex. To understand the reason why this false conclusion is often accepted in a courtroom setting, we must reconsider rape myths and stereotypes.
 

One of the myths about sexual assault is that torn clothing and physical resistance resulting in injury must occur in order for a sexual act to be truly nonconsensual. However, many sexual assault victims report that they try to avoid incurring physical injury (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994; Renner & Yurchesyn, 1994). As a result, their resistance efforts are either strictly verbal or involve physical exchanges that stop short of inflicting serious injury. Nevertheless, our previous research shows that the false argument outlined above appears repeatedly in sexual assault trials in the form of a line of questions about whether the woman's clothing was torn and whether she resisted to the point of incurring physical harm (Parriag & Renner, 1998). Women who do not have torn clothing and who do not suffer physical harm while resisting a sexual advance are perceived as having implicitly consented to sex.
 

So far, we have reviewed how illogical arguments that are categorically false, either due to false premises or false deductions, are in fact accepted in the courtroom. The problem does not stop with faulty formal logic, however. Our analysis of court transcripts reveal examples of many questions based on informal logical fallacies.
 

Informal Fallacies
 

In addition to formal errors of logic involving arguments expressed in the form of categorical syllogisms, there is a second category of logical errors involving informal fallacies. Eighteen such fallacies have been delineated by philosophers (Copi, 1968); see Table 1 for fuller descriptions. Arguments that are based on fallacies can still be very compelling and may effectively sway listeners' opinions, especially if those arguments are passionately presented. For instance, political campaigns frequently include examples of such logical errors. One example of an argument involving an informal fallacy is an argument that attacks the character of a person, but does not address the merits of the case (formally known as argumentum ad hominem). An example from the political arena would be:
 
 

In sexual assault cases, similar attacks are made of the character of the victim that do not address the merits of the case, but draw attention to other factors that may cause some observers to evaluate the woman negatively. In categorizing the content of sexual assault trials, we found many examples of attacks on the victim's character. Consider this example taken from a case involving an 18 year old woman:
 

Defense: On this particular night you were drinking at St. Mary's when you arrived. That was orange juice and ...?
Victim: Peach Schnapps.
Defense: And later on you were drinking Tia Maria and milk?
Victim: Yes
Defense: You were of course eighteen and you knew the drinking age in Nova Scotia was 19?
Victim: Yes I did.
Defense: And then you went out and you went dancing? And you said that your usual practice is to go up to people, go up to men, and ask them to dance?
Victim: Yes.
 

It appears that the Defense is presenting two fallacious arguments simultaneously. The first argument points to the fact that this woman was actually too young to be in the bar legitimately:
 

The second argument incorporates a false premise in addition to an attack on the victim's character. It hinges on the acceptance of common myths and stereotypes about sexual assault:
 

This second personal attack is doubly faulty because it is based on the false premise that women who go to bars to dance are sexually available -- women who drink and dance all evening are NOT necessarily seeking to engage in sexual activity with someone that they meet at the bar.
 

Another frequently used informal fallacy is when an argument that purports to establish a particular conclusion is actually applicable towards proving a different conclusion (Ignoratio Elenchi). Frequently this type of argument involves focusing on some small detail which is irrelevant to proving whether a sexual assault took place, and using the witness' inability to remember this irrelevant detail to imply that their memory about the assault itself may not be accurate. For example in one case the witness had been threatened with a wrench during her sexual assault and was asked about the weapon.
 

Defense: " You have indicated today that the wrench . . . can you say that THAT is the wrench that was in the van on that particular night or is it just a wrench that looks like it?"
Victim: "It was a silver adjustable wrench."
Defense: "So you wouldn't be in a position to tell one silver adjustable wrench from another?"
Victim: "Um, well, when he had it in his hand, I, you know, all I saw was a silver adjustable wrench."
Defense: "But, I mean, you couldn't really tell one adjustable wrench from another adjustable wrench could you?"
 

Although the witness could not conclusively say THAT specific wrench presented in the courtroom was the one used in her attack, it does not negate the fact that a wrench was used in her attack. The important facts were that she told the police she was threatened by an silver adjustable wrench, she was able to correctly name the type and color of the wrench, such a wrench was found in the accused's van, and the wrench found in the van was an exhibit in the courtroom. However, her inability to positively identify the wrench in the courtroom was used by the defense attorney to question the accuracy of her testimony about the facts of her assault. Clearly, this line of questioning is not logical.
 

It is not possible in the space available to give a detailed example for each of the types of informal logical fallacies identified by philosophers. The list of fallacies most often found in the courtroom are shown in Table 1 (adapted from Copi, 1968), along with a brief definition and example as applied to sexual assault. The disturbing finding from the standpoint of justice is that exemplars of each of the themes identified in our earlier research on the substance of sexual assault trials can be used as illustrations of formal or informal logical fallacies.

Deductive and Inductive Reasoning
 

In the courtroom, either a judge or jury must evaluate the answers the witness gives in response to the questions asked by the Crown and the Defense. Court proceedings are not deductive exercises designed to find categorical truth -- seldom, if ever, do the arguments presented in court fit the format of formal deductive reasoning. Rather, a trial involves reducing the events in question to a collection of individual scenarios, the content of which has been captured by our 24 categories (Parriag & Renner, 1998). These scenarios are connected together in narrative form; the Crown and the Defense each weave a different version of the events in their closing statements in an attempt to lead the judge or jury toward a conclusion of guilty or not guilty. For the judge or jury listening to the versions presented by the Crown and Defense, the task of reaching a conclusion about whether a sexual assault took place is an inductive reasoning process. Logicians distinguish between deductive and inductive reasoning in the following way:
 
 

... we characterize a deductive argument as one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises with absolute necessity, this necessity not being a matter of degree and not depending in any way upon whatever else may be the case. And in sharp contrast we characterize an inductive argument as one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises only with probability, this probability being a matter of degree and dependent upon what else may be the case (Copi, 1978:35).

Inductive arguments do not always explicitly acknowledge that their conclusions are inferred only with "probability." Furthermore, the premises of inductive arguments are not demonstratively valid, nor do the conclusions of such arguments follow with "necessity" from their premises. In the behavioral sciences, the confidence with which one can make statements about the likelihood of a particular outcome is reflected in calculations of statistical probability -- only when the probability of making an error is low enough (e.g., p<.05) do researchers feel justified in drawing conclusions about a phenomenon of interest. However, in a courtroom setting, the judge or jury cannot calculate a statistical probability that can serve to guide their decisions regarding the likelihood that a particular sexual act constitutes sexual assault. Rather, they must make a mental approximation of whether the interpretation of "guilty" can be reached "beyond a reasonable doubt" (i.e., is statistically significant).
 

The difficulties with estimating probability are not restricted to the final decision about whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty of perpetrating sexual assault. There are decision points all the way through the narrative. The probability of each event in the chain must be considered in order to arrive at a conclusion regarding whether a given woman was the victim of sexual assault rather than a willing participant in consensual sex. Unfortunately, rape myths and stereotypes may lead judges and juries to underestimate or overestimate the probability of different events in the chain. As an example of inductive reasoning, consider the rape myth surrounding torn clothing which we used to illustrate a false deduction. If the victim's clothes were torn, the Crown attorney introduces them as evidence of the sexual assault; if not torn, the Defense introduces them as evidence of consensual sex. The torn/untorn distinction is based entirely on the myth that a sexually assaulted woman will actively resist having her clothing removed. Research has shown, however, that a sexual assault victim will usually submit to the assault rather than risk any further injury, often removing her own clothing on demand (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Statistically, most women who are victims of sexual assault tend to behave like robbery victims -- they usually try to avoid being physically harmed in addition to having something of value taken from them (Renner & Yurchesyn, 1994). Thus it is actually more probable that a sexual assault victim will not have her clothing torn. However, the myths regarding what constitutes "real" sexual assault are powerful enough that the issue of non-torn clothing remains an integral part of the defense in a sexual assault trial.
 

The breakdown in the inductive reasoning process that results in miscalculation of the probability that a particular sexual act was indeed sexual assault is transparently obvious when the crime in question is a robbery (there are actually quite a few similarities in the two types of crimes). Consider this scenario:
 
 

A man in an expensive suit, preoccupied by his thoughts about a meeting for which he was late, was walking briskly down the street. A voice from behind said "Excuse me, could you give me some directions?" Without thought he turned around, to be pushed into a recessed doorway beside an alley, held firmly against the door with his arm pushed painfully behind his back. "Don't shout! Give me your money and you won't get hurt!" The assailant removed the man's wallet, took the bills, and dropping the wallet ran down the alley. Too late, the man called out "robbery," but no one was there to hear, nor was any robber in sight. He picked up his wallet, went his meeting and then telephoned the police.

When the typical questions asked of sexual assault victims are applied to the crime of robbery, they are clearly inappropriate. Women who claim they have been sexually assaulted are routinely asked questions about clothing, resistance and recency of complaint, the answers to which are used by judges and juries to reach the conclusion that the sex was consensual and no crime occurred. If these same questions were asked of in the context of a robbery, they would not be sufficient to draw the conclusion that the victim voluntarily gave his money away and that no crime had occurred. In short, sexual assault victims must meet a different (higher) standard of resistance in order for their allegations to be taken seriously:
 

"You were wearing an expensive suit on the street? How much was the suit worth? And you had money in your wallet? Your wallet was in your pocket on that street! Is that correct?"
 

"And when a total stranger asked for directions you stopped in front of a doorway by an alley, didn't you? You didn't look around to assess the situation! You didn't move to curb! You stepped into the doorway with him!"
 

"At the point you were in the doorway, did you say 'No, I do not want to give you my money.' Did you do anything to let him know you did not want him to have your money, such as run or shout? No!"
 

"How many people did you pass on your way to the meeting? Did you tell anyone 'I was robbed!' Did you go in any store and say 'Phone the police, I was robbed!' Did you tell anyone at the meeting 'I was robbed!' No! Only after the meeting did you decide to phone the police, isn't that a fact?
 

When robbery is the reference point, the differential standard in what is seen as reasonable questioning in these two kinds of cases is clear. Robbery victims are never actually asked about their clothing choices, or about their motivations for interacting with their assailant, or about why they did not put up more of a fight when their assailant's intention to harm them became obvious. It is rarely suggested that the robbery victim provoked the crime; sexual assault victims are not given the same benefit of the doubt. It is outrageous that women who experience sexual assault are required to justify their choice of clothing and are subjected to the victim-blaming inherent in having their responses to the unfolding crime second-guessed. Few women would go to a social occasion dressed in a manner that does not match the social standard for that occasion, or would allow themselves to be physically harmed if they felt that a sexual assault could not be prevented. Unfortunately, the behaviors which would be viewed as reasonable and non-provocative in other crime contexts lead to the erroneous conclusion that women actually invite the sexual acts that are forced upon them when the crime in question is sexual assault.
 

Another illustration of improper inductive reasoning in sexual assault cases involves the argument that if a woman spends time in a bar, has social contact with a male, and then invites him into her apartment, that any ensuing sex must have been consensual. We have already illustrated that this particular argument is based on false premises. Nevertheless, the defense lawyer often asks questions about the chain of events leading up to the assault as though they were part of the victim's master plan for engaging in consensual sex on the occasion in dispute. Yet, at any night spot, most men are there with the intention of meeting women, just as women are there with the goal of meeting men. Most women have something to drink, as do the men. Most men and women do not assume that they will necessarily have access to sex with people they meet at the night spot simply because they have engaged in dancing and drinking together. But the improbable event of dancing leading directly to sex is treated as if it were probable when the case reaches the courtroom:
 

Defense: "You found Mr. L. to be an attractive man?"
Victim: "Yes I did."
Defense: "And that is one of the reasons why you danced with him so often, as opposed to the other men that night?"
Victim: "Yes"
Defense: "And you were quite content to spend the evening with him weren't you?"
Victim: "Yes."
Defense: "You found him attractive, pleasant, polite, interesting?"
Victim: "Yes."
 

The probability of consensual sex when drinking and dancing have occurred or when the woman's clothing is not torn are greatly miscalculated in sexual assault cases. Both events are insufficient to draw the conclusion that consensual sex occurred. Rather, drinking and dancing is the most probable outcomes of attendance at a night spot -- it is the socially normative response to being at a night club. On the other hand, lack of torn clothing is the most probable outcome of sexual assault -- choosing to avoid a physical confrontation resulting in torn clothing and/or injury is the most frequent response to being attacked. The practice of treating the improbable event of consensual sex under these conditions as though it was the probable outcome of normative social behavior only serves to enhance the existing rape mythology.
 

In short, inductive reasoning in everyday life is very difficult because the decision-making process can not be facilitated by the calculation of statistical probabilities associated with different events. However, there exists sufficient descriptive statistical research on sexual assault such that it is possible to ascertain what events are probable and improbable. Dancing, drinking and untorn clothing at the end of the evening are all highly probable outcomes resulting from normative social behavior -- these occurrences cannot be used to imply consensual sex. At the most basic level, most consensual sex does not result in torn clothing. Thus if a woman's clothing is torn and damaged, probability favors the belief that the sex was not consensual. However, it does not follow that because a woman's clothing was not torn that the sex was consensual. The argument that lack of torn clothing is indicative of consensual sex is a formal categorical logical fallacy based on two negative premises that usually goes unchallenged during the court process. This faulty argument is then used as an element in the inductive reasoning process by judges and juries and plays a role in their reaching a verdict (often unjust) in sexual assault cases.
 

The correct use of inductive reasoning must take into account the simultaneous probability of many events. To illustrate, the odds of flipping a coin and getting "heads" is .5 but the odds of getting ten heads in a row is only .0001, a statistically rare event. If ten heads in a row occur, we may conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the coin is loaded. Yet in sexual assault cases the most basic features of simple probability are reversed such that improbable events are inferred as probable. These erroneous probabilities are then combined in a way that often leads to a false and unjust conclusion regarding whether a particular sex act was consensual or criminal.
 

As a final example, consider this case involving a victim who had dinner with her fiancé's friend. Following dinner, they both had a few drinks and after the drinks, and she offered to give him some frozen fish, courtesy of her fisherman fiance. After a few moments of small talk on the couch in her apartment, the friend sexually assaulted the victim. The defense lawyer in this case went through the chain of events leading up to the assault in an effort to lead the jury to the conclusion that the victim must have wanted sex (the jury accepted this version of events and found the accused not guilty). In this example, it is improbable that consensual sex would have happened on the couch rather than the bedroom. In other trials in which the accused was acquitted, the sex acts in question took place on the bathroom floor and a concrete hallway even though there was a bedroom available, and on a frigid water front and a gravel road when the back seat of a car was available. That these circumstances lead judges and juries to the conclusion that the disputed sex acts were "probably" consensual (or in the words of one judge, just "raw sex"), is not justifiable from the perspective of logic.
 

Our previous research (Parriag & Renner, 1998) on sexual assault provided an exhaustive set of 24 categories for classifying the types of questions that comprise the direct and cross-examination of a witness. Every case we examined was comprised of an average of 30 distinct scenarios. Exemplars of the 24 categories consistently double as examples of formal and informal logical fallacies. Fallacious arguments are then woven together to lead judges and juries toward a conclusion that is actually based on faulty inductive reasoning. Of particular importance to explore in sexual assault cases are the reasons why false arguments have such power, the mechanisms though which the legal doctrine permits logic to be optional in the courtroom, and the prescriptive implications for legal reform for the achievement of greater social justice.
 

The Power of Myths
 

The courts are inherently conservative institutions, and they are influenced by popular myths and stereotypes about the nature of sexual assaults. Unfortunately, because the courts are the only means of legal recourse available to citizens, any failure by the courts to ensure just outcomes for sexual assault victims that results from accepting myths and stereotypes actually serves to reinforce male sexual violence. But as the sole means of legal recourse, the courts could potentially be a powerful force for instrumental change. Thus far, this potential has gone largely unfulfilled in the context of sexual assault -- law reform in this area has most often occurred in response to pressure from women's groups rather than from pressure from within the legal system to correct a fundamental flaw in the legal procedure itself. Thus, while the courts are far from being the first to recognize the distorting effects of myths and stereotypes, this recognition must occur so that justice and fairness may be achieved by women who are the victims of male sexual violence.
 

Legal Mechanisms
 

The legal mechanism of "discounting" operates in a two-fold fashion. First, as we have shown in our previous research (Renner, et al., 1997), the myths and stereotypes operate through selectivity and disparity to limit the number and types of cases in which victims will receive recourse through the legal process. Specifically, whenever there is a relationship between the offender and victim, when there is no physical harm, and when the offender is not otherwise criminally dangerous, the legal process discounts the seriousness of an offense through lower rates of prosecution, conviction and reduced sentences (Frohman, 1991; Gregory & Lees, 1996; Kerstetter & Van-Winkle, B, 1990). In cases of male sexual violence, there is almost always a relationship, seldom physical harm, and the offender is from the family or social network of the victim. Thus, the conditions under which male sexual violence is excused are identical with the normative relationships between men and women, resulting in systematic bias against victims of the crime of sexual assault (Renner, et al., 1997).
 

The second mechanism, identified and discussed in the present paper, explains how this discounting takes place. The myths and stereotypes actually enter into the formal deliberations of the court in ways which violate the rules of logic. In other words, false premises are accepted as if they were true, formal and informal logical fallacies are frequently advanced, and improbable events treated as if they were probable. Because the myths and stereotypes are so widely accepted, these failures of logic are construed as reasonable. Given our findings, women are quite right to be skeptical that their experiences will be validated in court (Gregory & Lees, 1994; Konradi, 1997, 1998). In short, the legal doctrine has failed to address the phenomenon which it was intended to remedy.
 

What Can Be Done?
 

The first issue, the confounding of the nature of male sexual violence with the excusing conditions, will require a redefinition of the nature of sexual offenses (Renner, et al., 1997). Sexual assault is a crime that is distinctly different from other crimes and the courts must take this difference into account when considering the issues of relationship, harm and danger. The second issue, the failure of courtroom questioning to meet the standard of logic, also requires a direct intervention. Responsibility rests with the official actors in a trial; the Defense, Crown and Judge each has special legal and ethical obligations for which they should be held accountable.
 

The role of the Defense is problematic but not ambiguous. The task of the Defense is to protect the accused. Many books have been written on how to effectively cross examine a witness to diminish the effectiveness of their testimony. Although there is broad latitude given to the Defense for aggressive cross-examination of witnesses, there are legal and ethical limits to how far the Defense may go to protect an accused. No party is allowed to hide or destroy evidence that is germane to the trial. However, using tactics that are known means of distorting the truth, and knowingly advancing illogical arguments certainly compromises the integrity of the legal process. In order for a just and democratic society to flourish,. the legal process must serve rather than pervert the ends of justice. Yet in the case of sexual assaults, this goal is not being met as the legal system fails to bring forward cases which represent the true nature of sexual assault and facilitates the Defense in conducting an inquiry that distorts the victim's experience through permitting the use of fallacious reasoning in the courtroom (Spencer, 1987).
 

In contrast, the role of the Crown is neither problematic nor ambiguous. In an adversarial system it is the responsibility of the Crown to prevent any miscarriage of justice. Typically, this responsibility includes the requirement that the Crown disclose all evidence to the Defense, even evidence that may prejudice the Crown's own case, in order that the accused may have an opportunity to counter all charges. However, this commitment to defend the ideal of justice has two sides -- it also requires that the Crown avoid a miscarriage of justice by passively failing to challenge the introduction of false reasoning by the Defense. The Crown must be encouraged to adopt a more aggressive role and to actively raise objections to the obvious logical fallacies.
 

The role of the Judge is problematic simply because the Judge must deal with the ambiguity of arguments. While the examples we presented are obvious, others will be ambiguous. A definitive line between what should be judged reasonable or unreasonable has yet to be drawn. As a result, a considerable degree of legal debate will be necessary to clarify what is required to protect women based on principles of fundamental justice and to protect and preserve the integrity of the justice process. What is categorically true, however, is that the Judge has considerable authority over the proceedings within a trial, and that logic cannot be optional. The difficulty of the task is no excuse for avoiding the reiterative process necessary to define the guidelines that judges must follow in order to uphold the fundamental principle that reason must prevail if justice is to be served. This process must start with Judges who will not permit the inquiries in their courtrooms to be a verbal recapitulation of the sexual assault itself (Russell, 1989).
 

Social Justice
 

The confounding of the excusing conditions and the defining conditions of sexual assault (i.e., the existence of a relationship, absence of physical harm, and a non-criminal background of the accused), results in selectivity and disparity of social justice. Thus the cases that the courts address are a small subsample of sexual assault phenomena. By focusing legal attention on an atypical portion of male sexual violence, a large percentage of women are excluded from legal protection. The inclusion of the same set of myths and stereotypes that promote selectivity and disparity into the courtroom arguments create a situation where arguments based on logical fallacies are frequently advanced in the relatively small number of cases that reach the courts.
 

The combined effect of these two failures of the legal doctrine exact a heavy price that has at least three civic consequences: First, women tend to refrain from reporting sexual assaults. This choice reflects good judgement on the part of many women, who quite accurately expect the court to "discount" the seriousness of the offense through distortions of its actual nature. Paradoxically, women are often blamed for their failure to make use of the legal system. What seems to be overlooked is that justice not served is justice denied, and denial of justice weakens the civic pillars of democratic society. The catch-22 that victims of sexual assault face is a contradiction for which the legal system, not women, must be held socially and politically responsible.
 

Second, fixing responsibility on the legal system requires public and political recognition that the law and legal doctrine itself is one of the major sources of the very problem for which it is the intended remedy. The existence of this type of vicious circle is compelling evidence for the necessity of a new round of law reform. The law must address the actual nature of male sexual violence and acknowledge the seriousness of sexual violence in ways which do not confound the offense of sexual assault with the conditions that render most other offenses "not serious."
 

Third, there must be greater reliance on evaluation research, rather than case law, as the path to achieving higher levels of social justice. Justice is an ideal, it is not embodied in the technical procedures and doctrines designed to achieve the ideal. The degree to which the ideal is approached can only be known through an examination of the outcomes of the legal process. Thus, constructive social changes that will contribute to a strong civic foundation require a reiterative process of application, evaluation, and re-definition of what constitutes justice. Continued reliance on case law will not lead to social change; the re-definitions must be based on reason, and each revised application must be evaluated to ascertain whether greater justice has been achieved. As a continuous reiterative process, the cycle may be broken at any link. The current paper is quite specific about the legal mechanisms that are now responsible for failures of social justice in the context of sexual assault. Our claims that the current law does not serve women and children well is based on empirical evidence, not simply on abstract theoretical arguments. We are at a point where continued resistance to change may be seen as a broken link such that legal doctrine is an impediment to evolutionary progress toward greater social justice.
 

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